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Abstract
In recent years, researchers have increasingly turned their attention to the proliferation of small
arms and light weapons. Small arms are difficult to track and are not the stuff of military
parades, but they are immensely destructive. In addition to what is already circulating, a
substantial percentage of what is newly produced enters the black market and is destined for
conflict zones across the globe. I argue that the illicit trade in small arms shares some important
properties with networked forms of organization studied by sociologists. I then employ
quantitative methods developed for the study of social networks in an effort to show the basic
structure of illegal small arms transfers worldwide. The analysis draws from my Illicit Arms
Transfers Database (IATD) still in development, so the results make use of the most rudimentary
information being collected. They are suggestive, however, and the analytical approach promises
to shed considerable light on a corner of the international arms trade that is of great interest to the
research and activist communities, and of great consequence to those in war-torn regions of the
world.

Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association,
26-29 March 2008, San Francisco. My thanks to Nicholas Marsh for supplying the reports
contained in NISAT’s Black Market Archives.

THE ILLICIT ARMS TRADE: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Despite the downward trend in the total dollar value of the arms trade since the end of the cold
war, there is no such trend in the international transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALW).
Comprehensive and reliable longitudinal data on the volume of the SALW trade are only now
becoming available, but developments over the past two decades point to an increase in the flow
of this type of weaponry. The proliferation of low-intensity warfare, conflicts in which SALW
figure prominently, is a source of increased demand, while stocks of military surplus created by
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union vastly increased supply.
Light weaponry continues to be produced—by an expanding number of manufacturers, many of
them driven to export in order to achieve economies of scale—and some of this is added to the
second-hand equipment circulating in today’s war zones.
Of this trade in SALW, the value of which has been estimated at roughly $4 billion per
year, probably 10-20 percent occurs in the black and gray markets. 1 Information about the illicit
arms trade abounds, particularly in the form of investigative journalism and reports on the field
activities of nongovernmental organizations involved in small arms control and disarmament.
Although much of this information has been gathered, collated, and examined by researchers in
the academic and activist communities, systematic data collection and analysis has yet to proceed
very far. Data collection itself is a formidable task. Aside from the obvious difficulty deriving
from the efforts of black marketeers to keep their activities out of view, the variety of actors,
locales, equipment, and forms of transaction involved in the illicit arms trade presents a major
challenge for any attempt to catalog them in a systematic way. Nevertheless, some progress is
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being made and it is not too early to begin mapping the structure of black market transfers of
SALW.
This paper is a preliminary examination of the structure of illicit arms flows worldwide.
It is preliminary in two ways. First, I am in the fairly early stages of collecting and coding data
on illicit arms transfers, an effort that involves scrutinizing news accounts from multiple sources.
Second, the method of analysis used in this paper, social network analysis (SNA), consists of a
number of both descriptive and inferential techniques. The techniques most appropriate for
mapping the small arms trade are the descriptive ones, but it is also the case that any mapping
using descriptive methods is likely to be sensitive to missing and noisy data. Nevertheless,
having entered these caveats, I want to give some sense of the main locales involved in the
illegal small arms trade, as well as the usefulness of network analytical methods for illuminating
the structural features of this particular black market. As our understanding of this proliferation
problem improves, so too will the arms control efforts of policymakers and activists. But before
moving on to the empirical analysis, I will expand on my rationale for treating the small arms
trade as a social network.

THE ARMS NETWORK
Small arms transfers are entail economic transactions, but they are often transactions governed
by more than market forces. State-sanctioned transfers may be elements in an ongoing military
relationship between governments and illicit transfers, while driven on the supply side mainly by
the profit motive, nevertheless require a degree of trust and shared commitment to an
underground system of economic exchange. To highlight these features, which are common in
2

social networks, it is useful to contrast them with straightforward market transactions.
A market is a social entity that governs transactions between producers and consumers by
way of a price mechanism, and economists typically locate pure markets at one end of a range of
possible arrangements for the exchange of goods and services. This is the anarchic end. No
authority is exercised in a pure market; economic production is governed by prices, which result
from individual decisions affecting supply and demand. At the hierarchical end are organized
social entities like firms. Within a firm, economic production is governed by an entrepreneur,
whether an individual or a collective, who directs the allocation of resources within the
organization. One of the questions that has occupied economists is: under what circumstances do
markets give rise to hierarchical organizations as a means of coordinating economic exchange?
The classic treatment of this issue is by Coase, who maintained that “the operation of a
market costs something and that, by forming an organization and allowing some authority (the
‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved.” 2 In contemporary
scholarship, these sorts of costs are termed “transaction costs,” and they generally derive from
the inefficiencies associated with incomplete information. 3 Some economic transactions involve
uncertainties—e.g., about continued access to specialized inputs into the production process—
and although these might be handled by entering into contracts, the continual negotiation and
renegotiation of contracts is costly. Such transaction costs, at least some of them, can be
eliminated if the parties enter into an exchange relationship governed according to the bylaws of
a hierarchical organization. Under these circumstances, firms will realize efficiencies not
available in the open market and economic production and exchange will become more
profitable.
3

Patterns of economic exchange governed by more than market forces but by less than
hierarchical organizations have been of considerable interest to sociologists. Granovetter, for
instance, has echoed the common criticism of the neoclassical economic approach to
organization as offering a utilitarian and “undersocialized” conception of human action in which
little allowance is made for the impact of social relations on economic exchange (except as a
drag on the efficient allocation of resources). At the same time, early sociological correctives
tended to propose “oversocialized” conceptions of behavior whereby individuals simply, and
somewhat robotically, internalize societal norms, also leaving little room for the impact of
ongoing social relations. 4 For Granovetter and others, economic behavior is governed not only
by institutional arrangements designed to discourage malfeasance and reduce transaction costs,
or by a “generalized morality” instilled through the socialization process, but also by trust.
Economic action is embedded in ongoing social interaction and more emphasis needs to be
placed on “the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations
in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance.” 5
A similar gap seems to exist in the political science literature on international
organization. Liberals have criticized realists for failing to see international institutions as more
than epiphenomena deriving from the distribution of state power. Instead, taking cues from new
institutional economics, liberals see them as “information-providing and transaction costreducing entities.” 6 Constructivists, in turn, taking cues from the institutionalist approach in
sociology, fault liberals (and realists) for neglecting “the production and reproduction of
identities and interests” and for assuming that “how states treat each other in interaction does not
matter for how they define who they are.” 7 But to date the focus of constructivist analysis has
4

been on the socialization of states—“states are people too,” Wendt says—and on the emergence
and reinforcement of norms in international society, rather than on relations between states and
outcomes that fall short of norm creation and institution building. 8
In departing from transaction-cost explanations, sociologists who study economic
organization are not abandoning the notion of rational action. They are suggesting that social
constraints, or “embeddedness,” often makes seemingly nonrational behavior appear quite
reasonable. Many economic transactions “aim not only at economic goals but also at sociability,
approval, status, and power.” 9 In the realm of world politics, those studying the arms production
and transfer system have frequently observed that the arms acquisition policies of both
developed and developing states don’t always make sense in terms of either military or economic
efficiency. The “rationality” of those procurement patterns becomes apparent only when taking
into account less material motives like status, prestige, and the symbols of modern statehood. 10
And no less an authority than Hans Morgenthau, realism’s chief exponent, believed that
“prestige, however exaggerated and absurd its uses may have been at times, is as intrinsic an
element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations between
individuals.” 11
Inquiry into the role of social relations in the emergence of various forms of economic
organization is of fairly recent origin in sociology. But much of the research that has been done
on interpersonal relations in economic life focuses on the creation and maintenance of social
networks. Less anarchic than markets, networks of economic actors are at the same time not
hierarchically organized. Where price serves as a control mechanism in markets and authority
serves that function within a vertically integrated firm, personal relationships, typically
5

characterized by trust and a norm of reciprocity, are the glue that binds a social network together.
It may well be that, under conditions conducive to social networks, hierarchically organized
social entities are not required as a means of reducing uncertainty and managing transaction
costs, but from a sociological point of view that begs some important questions. What are those
conditions? To what extent can they be explained by the social, cultural, and political practices
that embed economic interaction? Alternatively, to what extent can they be explained by the
nature of particular forms of economic exchange?
Powell addresses the last of these questions, maintaining that some forms of exchange are
inherently more social than others. They depend not so much on formal authority, but on shared
interests and ongoing relationships. In network forms of exchange, “the entangling of obligation
and reputation reaches a point that the actions of the parties are interdependent.” The pattern of
interaction “looks more like a marriage than a one-night stand, but there is no marriage license,
no common household, no pooling of assets.” 12 Whereas market transactions are undertaken to
maximize returns in the short and medium term, network exchanges are sequential and contribute
to an overall pattern of enduring interaction. Much of what is exchanged in social networks is
difficult to price—know-how and styles of production, for example—so the flow of information
through networks is often “richer” than what is transmitted by the price mechanism in markets or
by controlled channels of communication within a vertically integrated firm. Finally, because the
mechanism of governance rests largely on trust and obligation, network forms of organization
function well when composed of homogenous groups of actors. The opportunism and guile
contributing to high transaction costs in the impersonal market setting is less common among
those sharing professional, ethnic, or ideological backgrounds, and thus hierarchical governance
6

structures are less likely to emerge.

State-sanctioned Arms Transfers
The arms trade is characterized by some of the same features found in network forms of
economic organization. Decisions to supply and purchase weaponry are often elements in
ongoing arms-transfer relationships. In the case of state-sanctioned transfers, they are elements
of more general military relationships. The supply of finished weapons systems can be
accompanied by instruction in the operation and maintenance of equipment, construction of
support facilities, and other forms of technical assistance. Arms transfers are, in many instances,
embedded in relationships of mutual defense—e.g., weapons flows between members of formal
military alliances like NATO—or in less formal commitments by suppliers to the security of
recipient states. Those more general military relations, whether formal or implied, may also
involve basing and overflight rights, military training and joint exercises, the coordination of
strategy and tactics, the sharing of military intelligence, and other forms of collaboration
intended to enhance the security of both parties to the transaction. While particular arms-transfer
agreements may take the form of arms-length contracts, much of their meaning is lost if they are
extracted from this social context. Instead of contracts, they may actually resemble long-term
investments in mutually beneficial interstate relationships.
Consistent with Powell’s description of exchanges within networks, it is difficult to
attach a value to the political and military commitments that often accompany arms transfers
between states. In addition to interstate commitments, weapons supplies embody the transfer of
military technology, and many deals include arrangements for the licensed production of military
7

equipment by the recipient. This flow of technology and know-how between states, which is also
hard to price, is an important feature of the contemporary arms trade and has had a measurable
impact on the emergence of a “third tier” of arms producers in the international system. 13 Thus,
the information and meaning embodied in arms transfers can be substantially richer than what
might be indicated by the market or military-use value of the weapons themselves.
Much more is involved in these transactions than a shipment of some increment of
destructive capability from one to another state. Because arms transfers are indicative of the
supplier’s commitment to the recipient’s security, as well as the recipient’s expectation (perhaps
backed up with certain concessions) that it can count on this commitment into the future, the
most significant and enduring arms-transfer relationships link states with congruent foreign
policy orientations. During the cold war, for instance, the United States and its allies tended to
supply arms to states whose policies were generally in accord with the global political-economic
status quo, while the Soviet Union and its allies tended to supply dissatisfied or revisionist
states. 14 There was, then, in the arms-transfer network a certain homogeneity among states with
the closest and most dependable ties. Such shared foreign policy orientations are not unlike the
shared backgrounds (professional, ethnic, religious) that help sustain social networks comprised
of individuals.

Black Market Transfers
Of course, not all arms transfers between states are imbued with social meaning; nor are transfers
between nonstate actors. Indeed, illicit arms transfers by private dealers are typically undertaken
solely for reasons of economic gain, so it might seem that the market conceptualization ought to
8

work well in this realm of the global arms trade. Yet illegal weaponry clearly does flow through
transnational networks, as do narcotics and other contraband; on its face, “networkness” seems to
be a more obvious feature of the black market arms trade than does its “marketness.”
When comparing market and network forms of organization—and one could imagine
hybrid forms as well—it is probably useful to distinguish between the nature of the goods being
exchanged and the mode of exchange. 15 Above I suggested that states sometimes transfer arms,
or sanction the transfer of arms, for reasons other than economic gain; arms transfers embody
security commitments as well as raw military capability. Analogous commitments usually do not
attach to black market transfers, at least those involving private dealers and their brokers. But
other types of commitments are involved that lend these transactions to network forms of
organization. Specifically, because these arms transfers are illegal and must be kept out of view,
the transactions that enable them—deal-making, document forgery, financial transfers, illicit
transport, and so on—also must be kept out of view, and parties to the transaction must trust each
other in this regard. Furthermore, in many cases, the parties to such transactions anticipate the
need for future exchanges, and therefore would like to be able to return to, or reactivate, these
transfer channels as those needs arise. Their options are kept open by a set of mutual
understandings and commitments to the maintenance of the social network. 16
I am suggesting that, in the black market, transferred weaponry is not itself indicative of
shared interests—say, common political or ideological goals that are furthered by the recipient’s
enhanced military capability. Yet the parties’ separate interests—economic, military, or
otherwise—surely are served by the maintenance of the black market’s infrastructure. Political,
ideological, or other religious and ethnic attachments, may be relevant in a different way,
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however. Because black market arms transfers occur in a lawless environment, one without
formal mechanisms of contract enforcement, parties to these transactions must rely more heavily
on trust (often reinforced by threat) than is the case for legal market transactions. This is why
many criminal organizations recruit members close to home. The social cohesion created by
ethnic, religious, or ideological bonds reduces the likelihood of defection and thus the risks of
operating in an extralegal environment. Economic theories of rebellion posit similar social
dynamics. 17
More theoretical work needs to be done in order to fully conceptualize the global arms
trade, and its multiple legal and illegal forms, as a social network. While it may be somewhat
premature to proceed with empirical analysis, I believe that the network characteristics of the
arms trade, and especially the black market trade, are sufficiently compelling that it is
appropriate to simultaneously explore its structural features using some of the quantitative
methods developed for social network analysis.

NETWORK DATA AND ANALYSIS
The Illicit Arms Transfers Database
The Illicit Arms Transfers Database (IATD) is an evolving dataset consisting of information
gleaned from news and other reports of illegal arms shipments crossing interstate borders. The
goal is to systematize the large amount of information that exists about the international black
market in armaments so that some of these data might be subjected to social scientific analysis.
Virtually all illicit arms transfers are SALW, and in this category of armament
researchers generally include pistols, rifles, assault rifles, carbines, machine guns, hand-held and
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mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, portable missile launchers,
and small caliber mortars. Two groups are at the forefront of compiling and systematizing
information on the small arms trade: the Small Arms Survey (SAS), based at the Graduate
Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms
Transfers (NISAT), affiliated with the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. SAS
maintains a publicly accessible database consisting of government publications and statements
pertaining to the small arms trade; its data are distributed primarily through print sources, most
notably the SAS yearbook. NISAT maintains an Internet database consisting of tallies of state-tostate transfers of small arms and light weapons. Thus, the primary focus of both groups’
systematic data collection efforts is the legal trade in SALW.
NISAT, however, also maintains a “Black Market File Archive,” a collection of news
stories and investigative reports on the illicit arms trade. These accounts, which range widely in
content and format, are collated into country folders based on the locale of the events described
therein. Another source of information is the WepsTrade newsgroup, an electronic mail list
maintained by David Isenberg, a senior analyst at the British American Security Council in
Washington, DC. Newsgroup subscribers receive news stories on all aspects of the arms trade,
including illicit transfers, collected from sources on the Internet. Both NISAT and Isenberg
obtain their reports from multiple news organizations, as well as other organizations providing
information on the black market arms trade. 18 These two sources provide the raw information
upon which the IATD is built.
The unit of observation in the IATD is an illicit arms transfer “event,” defined as
coterminous with a particular arms shipment’s journey from source to recipient, possibly
11

intercepted along the way. Each record in the database consists of data describing that event,
including the actors and locations involved in the shipment=s journey from originator to recipient
(or interceptor), as well as the information source. Most variables in the database are event
descriptors and can be grouped as they pertain to (a) the source of the arms shipment, (b) those
involved in the arms deal, (c) the characteristics of the arms shipped, (d) the journey that the
shipment took after leaving the source, and (e) the shipment’s destination. Table 1 shows the
categories of variables in the database and summarizes the type of information collected in each
category. The table does not list every variable in each category—for example, actors like
originators, recipients, dealers, etc., are also accompanied by information regarding their location
and type—but it does indicate the range of information that the IATD must incorporate in order
to capture the complexity of many illicit arms-transfer events. At present, there are over 60
variables in the database used to describe characteristics of different types of illicit transfers,
although most records are missing data for many of these variables simply due to the paucity of
information on black market transactions. Appendix A lists all of the event descriptors found in
the IATD. 19
[Table 1 about here]
The stories and reports collected by NISAT and Isenberg vary widely in the amount of
useful information they contain. Some articles include detailed accounts of arms shipments from
manufacturer to purchaser, including any number of participating intermediate dealers, brokers,
and shipping agents. 20 Other reports include no codable event information at all. Some reports
provide a wealth of background information, like previous events in ongoing arms-supply
relationships. Others pick up a particular shipment’s journey midstream, as when one military
12

organization supplies another organization, without any indication of where the first group
acquired the weaponry. Even when reports contain complete information, the events themselves
exhibit a wide range of forms. There is substantial variation in the number and type of
intermediaries engaged in illicit transfers, the nature of the illegalities involved (forged end-user
certificates, arsenal theft, etc.), and whether transfers were intercepted by state authorities or
someone else other than the intended recipient. Appendix B provides an example of the way
events described in an article from NISAT’s Black Market File Archive are coded for purposes
of inclusion in the IATD.
A major aim of the IATD Project to this point, one that has largely been achieved, has
been to develop a data structure that can accommodate the variety of forms that an illicit arms
transfer event may take. The set of coding rules has evolved over the course of the Project’s
lifespan (about four years) and has proven workable as a methodology for processing thousands
of articles to date. So far, the Project has examined about 6,800 articles from NISAT’s Black
Market File Archive, retrieving about 3,300 events.

Network Structure
The IATD is being constructed to permit researchers to map the illicit arms trade, thus
identifying key actors, transshipment locations, and destinations, as well as the dynamics of the
arms flows. The set of tools known as “social network analysis” (SNA), used extensively by
sociologists, is particularly promising for this purpose. 21 The focus of SNA is less on the
attributes or behavior of actors than on the structural dimensions of their social environment,
which are distilled from the overall pattern of relationships or exchanges among the actors. The
13

social network itself is defined as the group of actors and the relationships or interactions that
link them, and SNA methods are applied once it is assumed (or demonstrated) that a group of
actors constitutes a network. Select data from the IATD have been analyzed using elementary
SNA procedures in order to illuminate the main contours of the black market trade in Africa and
Asia. 22 Now, with a considerable amount of data assembled for all regions, it is becoming
possible to map the illicit arms-transfer network on a global scale.
The informational requirements for the present analysis are minimal, however. Nodes in
this network are operationalized as the state locales from which, to which, or through which
illicit weapons shipments have moved. Once the IATD is cleaned and cross-checked, the
database will allow researchers to operationalize network nodes as actors—suppliers, recipients,
brokers, etc.— involved in these transactions, with locale simply being one of their attributes, but
a more refined analysis along these lines is not advisable given the IATD’s present state of
development. Here state locales are shown as nodes in the network if they were involved in at
least one illegal arms transfer during the 1995–2005 period, the time span for which data have
been coded, and if there is sufficient information to identify the state locale at both ends of the
transfer. Although the database does contain a large number of additional descriptors, no other
information is used for present purposes.
The network, depicted graphically in Figure 1, consists of 156 nodes (state locales) with
680 links among them, blocked according to geographical region. Each node bears a three-letter
country code. The structure of the illicit arms trade resembles that of a scale-free network. In
contrast to random networks, in which links or social ties are distributed randomly across the
nodes, scale-free networks consist of some nodes with large numbers of connections (network
14

hubs), and many others with very few connections. One implication may be that the illicit arms
trade can be disrupted more efficiently by targeting identifiable hubs, which are most important
to the network’s connectivity.
[Figure 1 about here]

Central Locales
An illicit arms transfer is a directed link in that it represents the flow of military resources from
one state locale (or actor) to another. The network data are arranged as a square “sociomatrix” in
which there is both a row and a column for each node in the network. A cell in the matrix
contains a 1 if an actor located in the state represented by row i, designated ni, transferred arms
to an actor in the state represented by column j, designated nj, in which case xij = 1 ; otherwise xij
= 0. The main diagonal of the sociomatrix, where i = j, is ignored. 23 The outdegree of node i,
d(ni), is the number of other state locales to which arms from ni have been shipped; indegree,
d(nj), is the total number of state locales from which arms to nj have been shipped. That is,

d (ni ) =

∑x

∀i ≠ j

ij

and d (n j ) =

∑x

∀j ≠ i

ji

,

(1)

which are, respectively, the row i and column j totals of the sociomatrix. If there are s state
locales in the network, the maximum number of directed ties between them is s(s − 1).
In most social networks, certain actors are more prominent than others and the evidence
of their prominence is often the number and type of social ties they maintain with other actors.
The centrality of a network actor is sometimes indexed as its outdegree or indegree (or both), but
since these measures are greatly affected by the number of actors in a network, it is useful to
normalize the index. Thus, the normalized outdegree and indegree centrality indexes for state
15

locales in the illegal arms trade can be computed as

C D′ (ni ) =

∑x

∀j ≠i

ij

s −1

and C D′ (n j ) =

∑x

∀i ≠ j

ji

s −1

.

(2)

Although this index will identify the most connected locales, it does so by counting only direct
links between nodes. 24
Figures 2 and 3 arrange the state locales in the illicit arms trade so that the most central
locales are positioned nearer the center of ten concentric rings, while less central locales are
positioned nearer the periphery. Figure 2 is constructed using inwardly directed links. Several
African countries (indicated in blue) figure as the most prominent locales for the inflow of illicit
arms. This is not surprising given the frequency and endurance of violent conflict in the region.
Angola (AGO), among the African countries, has the highest centrality, followed by Congo
(COG), Sudan (SUD), Sierra Leone (SLE), Liberia (LBR), Uganda (UGA), Rwanda (RWA),
Eritrea (ERI), and Democratic Republic of Congo (ZAR). Other non-African conflict areas also
stand out: Colombia (COL), Pakistan (PAK), Israel (ISR), Palestine (PLO), Iraq (IRQ), Bosnia
(HRV). These locales, of course, exhibit the highest demand for small arms and light weapons.
Related to this, as both cause and effect, is the presumed existence of an underground
infrastructure that makes getting weapons to these locales possible (even easy)—and of course
profitable.
[Figure 2 about here]
The most prominent locales for the outflow of illicit arms are indentified by examining
outward directed links, as shown in Figure 3. It is noteworthy that, in comparison with inflow
locales, there are relatively fewer states positioned near the middle of the chart; there are fewer
16

central arms sources than there are arms destinations. European countries (in purple), and
especially former Soviet-bloc states, occupy positions of prominence: Czech Republic (CZR),
Russia (RUS), Bulgaria (BGR), Ukraine (UKR), Belorussia (BLR), Poland (POL), Romania
(ROM). One explanation might be found in the availability of cold war surplus and a black
market infrastructure nurtured originally by their communist economic systems. Other European
and non-European locales are also important in the illicit arms trade: Britain (GBR), Belgium
(BEL), Germany (GER), United States (USA), Israel (ISR), South Africa (ZAF), China (CHN),
Iran (IRN).
[Figure 3 about here]

Pivotal Locales
Nodes in a network may also be important to the extent that they are positioned between two
other nodes. In the case of the illicit arms trade, when one locale, ni, has links to two other
locales, nj and nk, which are not linked directly, ni may provide an important conduit for arms
shipments between actors in nj and nk. Some of the most important conduits are likely to be those
lying on the geodesic paths connecting nj and nk. Thus, another measure of centrality,
betweenness centrality, starts with the number of geodesics, gjk, linking nodes j and k, and the
number of these that contain node i, gjk(ni). Betweenness can be measured as the sum of the
probabilities that node i will be pivotal in transactions between j and k: 25
CB =

∑

∀j < k , j ≠ i ≠ k

g jk (ni )
g jk

.

This measure is at its maximum when node i is located on all geodesics in the network. Not
including node i, there are (s − 1)(s − 2) possible directional links, and half that number of
17

(3)

possible nondirectional links. CB can therefore be normalized as:
−1

⎛ ( s − 1)( s − 2) ⎞
C B′ = C B ⎜
⎟ .
2
⎠
⎝

(4)

Figure 4 identifies the state locales with the highest betweenness scores: Israel and the
United States. They are followed by some of the former the Soviet-bloc states identified as
important source locales (Czech Republic, Russia, Bulgaria, Poland), as well as some of the
African states identified as central destinations (Angola, South Africa, Congo, Sudan). The
literature on social and physical networks has long recognized the importance of such pivotal
nodes in mediating the interactions between nonadjacent nodes. 26 Nodes characterized by high
levels of betweenness are also the network’s “high stress” points. Indeed, computing
betweenness scores would seem to be the best way to identify the network’s hubs and, for those
wishing to disrupt the network, the best way to identify targets for concentrated political action.
[Figure 4 about here]
Closely related to this concept of betweenness is “brokerage.” Brokers are nodes
positioned between nonadjacent actors and through which a directional interaction takes place.
Nodes that function as brokers for many node pairs therefore have high betweenness scores.
Social network analysts have gone on to specify particular brokerage roles based on the actors’
membership in groups. 27 For instance, a node occupies a “coordinator” role when it is interposed
between nodes within its same group or organization. When the three nodes are members of
different groups, the broker acts as a “liaison.” Figure 5 depicts the brokerage roles operating
when the broker and one actor are members of one group and the other actor is a member of a
second group. Brokers (B) that mediate inflows into their group are “gatekeepers”; those that
mediate outflows from their own group are “representatives.”
18

[Figure 5 about here]
Identifying important brokers in a social network involves counting the number of triads
in which that node is positioned as an intermediary. In the illicit arms trade, there are individuals
and organizations that serve as brokers for particular arms transactions, and the IATD records
these actors and their roles when the information is available. Because this analysis is limited to
state locales, however, to say that locale B served as a broker for transfers between A and C
simply means that arms were shipped from A to B and arms—not necessarily the same ones—
were shipped from B to C; but arms were not shipped directly from A to C. That is, locale B is a
broker to the extent that B could possibly function as a conduit for the shipment of illegal
weapons from A to C, based on observed arms trade patterns from 1995 to 2005.
The groups used for this examination of brokerage are geographic regions, although
potentially more interesting groupings would be possible for this sort of analysis (for example,
based on political and economic characteristics, and not simply geographic ones). If node j is a
broker for i and k, then let bj(ik) = 1; otherwise bj(ik) = 0. Node j’s brokerage score for the
network is:
Bj =

∑ ∑ b (ik ) .

∀i ≠ j ∀k ≠ j

j

(5)

The score can be calculated conditional on the direction of the transaction flow and i’s, j’s, and
k’s group membership, so that brokerage scores correspond to j’s role as a coordinator,
representative, gatekeeper, etc.
Figure 5 shows the scores for the top “gatekeeper” and “representative” broker locales in
the illicit arms trade. It is no surprise that the leading gatekeepers are African, Asian, and Middle
Eastern countries; they are destinations for weapons shipped from outside the region and, we can
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hypothesize, departure points for arms transiting to other locales within the region. Angola and
Iran top the list, which conforms to their positions as central locales, measured in terms of indegree or betweenness. It is also no surprise that most of the leading representatives are
European states; along with Israel, China, and the United States, they are the most prominent
source locales in the illicit arms trade, and possibly also transit points for arms leaving the region
from other states. Britain is the most prominent broker locale in regard to the shipment of illicit
arms out of Europe, followed by former Soviet-bloc countries. Again, I want to emphasize that
the data used here only allow me to identify as brokers those nodes interposed between supplier
and recipient locales. Determining the extent to which these nodes serve as conduits for weapons
cargo transferred between nonadjacent nodes requires shipment-level data that I am still in the
process of collecting but have not yet analyzed.

CONCLUSION

The illicit arms trade shares some important properties with networked forms of organization
studied by sociologists. The complex and convoluted nature of black market arms transfers suits
this realm of the arms trade especially well to investigation as a social network. Like any
underground activity involving the exchange and transport of contraband (drugs, counterfeit
currency, humans), the illicit arms trade operates within an informal organizational environment.
The forces of supply and demand are mediated by the forces of trust, loyalty, and mutual
commitment that govern the flow of information and material within a social network. 28
Since my dataset on the illicit arms trade are still at an early stage of development, the
analysis in this paper employs only descriptive methods designed to explore the main structural
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features of social networks. The results are not definitive, but they are suggestive. The black
arms market appears to be structured as a scale-free network, even when the network nodes are
operationalized fairly crudely as state locales. The locales occupying central position in the
network readily stand out. African countries are prominent as destinations for illicit weapons
flows. Angola, in particular is directly linked to many other locales and is positioned as a
potentially pivotal node for arms transfers following indirect routes. Among the countries where
illicit arms shipments originate, former members of the Soviet bloc appear central, whether as
weapons sources or as conduits linking other locales in the network. One explanation for their
prominence in Africa’s illicit arms trade might be found in the availability of cold war surplus
and a black market infrastructure nurtured originally by their communist economic systems.
This, at least, is a reasonable working hypothesis for subsequent empirical research. Other
important countries in the illicit arms trade include the United States, Britain, France, China,
Israel, and Iran.
The utility of SNA methods (or any other quantitative methods) for illuminating the illicit
arms trade obviously hinges on the quality of data that can be collected. Mapping the structure of
the black market is hampered by the secrecy with which deals are concluded and the duplicity of
the actors involved. 29 What we do know about it is due mainly to the perseverance of
enterprising activists and investigative reporters and, as with any data source, this information is
subject to measurement error and selection bias. The analysis of network dynamics often requires
fairly complete information about nodes and links, particularly if the aim is to model network
vulnerabilities. If the lack of information makes it necessary to restrict analysis to sampled data,
important elements of the network structure may be missed. However, this danger should be less
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pronounced when examining scale-free networks because even incomplete information is likely
to identify the most prominent nodes. 30 That is, the same feature that makes these networks
robust in the face of random failure also makes them more visible in the face of systematic
efforts to reveal them. If I am right that the illicit arms trade is a scale-free network, then the fact
that some of it remains hidden from view need not prevent us from mapping its basic structure.
More sophisticated SNA methods will become useful as our data collections improve.
Rather than simply identifying actors and locales in the illicit arms trade, it will become possible
to model the linkages among them as a function of factors on both the supply and demand side.
The role of ongoing conflict, social and economic deprivation, weapons surpluses, criminal
networks, and other conditions conducive to proliferation have been highlighted by small arms
researchers and activists. The cause of arms control will be advanced to the extent that we can
identify the most important forces driving proliferation, especially those that are most subject to
policy intervention and manipulation, and the actors and locales that figure prominently as hubs
in the arms supply network. When resources are scarce and attentions divided, efforts must be
focused where they will do the most good.
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Appendix A: Event Descriptors in the IATD

Arms Source

Arms Characteristics

Originator
Originator Type
Originator Code
Originator Location
Originator Location Code
Originator Region Code

Arms Type
Began Legal
License Violation
Battlefield Recovery
Arsenal Theft
Military Personnel
Sanctions Violation
Rogue Regime
Refurbished
Model
Manufacturer
Price
Quantity

Arms Deal
Unspecified Intermediary
Intermediary Type
Intermediary Code
Intermediary Home
Intermediary Location Code
Intermediary Region Code
Arms Dealer
Dealer Type
Dealer Code
Dealer Home
Dealer Location Code
Dealer Region Code
Arms Broker
Broker Type
Broker Code
Broker Home
Broker Location Code
Broker Region Code
Shipping Agent
Agent Type
Agent Code
Agent Home
Agent Location Code
Agent Region Code

Arms Journey
End User Certificate
Transporter
Transporter Home
Transship Location
Transship Location Code
Transship Region Code
Intercepted
Interceptor
Interceptor Code
Intended Recipient
Interception Date
Intercept Location
Intercept Location Code
Intercept Region Code
Shipment Date
Arms Destination
Recipient
Multiple Recipients
Recipient Type
Recipient Code
Recipient Location
Recipient Location Code
Recipient Region Code
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Appendix B: Coding Example

Coding text-based accounts of illicit arms transfers is a labor intensive task. Researchers have
made considerable progress in the development of automated coding algorithms for the creation
of events data in other areas of international relations research, which has drastically reduced the
time and labor required to generate reliable data suitable for analysis. However, descriptions of
arms-transfer events are typically too complex to parse with the software available at this time.
But as further progress is made on the machine coding of international events, new opportunities
may become available for automated coding of these events as well.
What follows is an example of an article appearing in NISAT’s Black Market File Archive, and
descriptors for two arms-transfer events identified from this account and entered into the IATD.
The article is from Haarretz, the Israeli daily, and was distributed by the U.S. government’s
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).

Article
Israeli Businessmen Suspected of Selling Arms to Angolan Rebels
The United Nations is checking suspicions that Israeli firms and
businessmen traded in arms and diamonds with UNITA rebels in Angola,
in violation of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. The
impression of UN officials is that the Israeli Government is not very
keen to cooperate in the investigation and is making no efforts to
track down the suspects. A special monitoring committee set up by the
Security Council in recent weeks approached the Foreign Ministry in
Jerusalem via Israel's UN Ambassador Yehuda Lancry.
At the center of the investigation is Starco Investment and Trade of
13 Martin Buber St. in Haifa. The firm is suspected of having bought
weapons for $156,000 from Romtechnica, Romania's government arms
company, in March 1996. According to the end-user certificates
obtained by Ha'aretz, the final destination of the shipment was Togo's
armed forces in the capital of Lome.
The shipment, flown aboard a cargo plane of the Bulgarian airline
Avia-Service, consisted of 2,000 Kalashnikovs and pistols. However,
the bill of goods stated that the shipment consisted of "technical
equipment." A larger arms shipment from Romania to Togo three years
later was again described as "technical equipment." This shipment
included 40 RPG launchers and huge quantities of ammunition. The deal
totaling $0.5 million was mediated by East European Shipping
Corporation, a firm based in the Bahamas and represented in Europe by
Trade Investment International Limited, with an address in Britain.
This shipment was transported aboard Coraca, a ship flying a
Panamanian flag and headed for Lome. A check by the UN investigators,
assisted by forensic experts, revealed that the end-user certificates
of both shipments were forgeries.
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Event 1

Event 2

Originator: Romtechnica
locale: Romania
type: state manufacturer
Recipient: UNITA
locale: Angola
type: insurgent group
Dealer: Starco Investment & Trade
locale: Haifa, Israel
type: private company
Illegality
sanctions violation: UN
license violation: end-user certificate
Arms Shipped
type: Kalashnikovs, pistols
price: $156,000
Date: March 1996

Originator: Romtechnica
locale: Romania
type: state manufacturer
Recipient: UNITA
locale: Angola
type: insurgent group
Dealer: Starco Investment & Trade
locale: Haifa, Israel
type: private company
Shipping Agent
East European Shipping Corp.
locale: Bahamas
type: private company
Trade Investment International Ltd.
locale: Great Britain
type: private corporation
Transporter: Coraca
home: Panama
Illegality
sanctions violation: UN
Arms Shipped
type: RPG launchers
price: $0.5 million
Date: 1999
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Table 1

Information Contained in the Illicit Arms Transfers Database

source

deal

characteristics

journey

destination

originator

dealer
broker
shipping agent

type
model
manufacturer
price
quantity
illegality

transporter
transshipment point
interception

recipient

Asia

Europe

North
America
Africa
South
America
Middle
East

Figure 1

Central
America

Locales in the Illicit Arms Trade

Africa
Asia
Middle East
Europe
North America
Central America
South America

Figure 2

Inflow Centrality in the Illicit Arms Trade

Africa
Asia
Middle East
Europe
North America
Central America
South America

Figure 3

Outflow Centrality in the Illicit Arms Trade

Africa
Asia
Middle East
Europe
North America
Central America
South America

Figure 4

Betweenness Centrality in the Illicit Arms Trade

Gatekeepers

Representatives
B

B
A

C

A

Africa
Angola
South Africa
Uganda

76
32
27

Asia
Pakistan
China
Afghanistan

36
32
22

Middle East
Iran
Iraq
Libya

71
18
12

Figure 5

C

Europe
Britain
Russia
Czech Rep.
Bulgaria
France

131
114
94
89
73

Others
Israel
China
United States

108
43
22
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